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LET FDA REGULATE ITS OWN DRUGS!:
AN ARGUMENT FOR NARCOTIC CONTROL
AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE RISK
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION
STRATEGIES (REMS)
Christopher J. Frisina*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A

merica has a problem with prescription drugs. In 2012, nearly
500,000 Americans over the age of twelve used a prescription
painkiller for a non-medical purpose for the first time.1 Deaths
resulting from the overdose of prescription painkillers have reached a
staggering 17,000 per year in the United States.2 While few people
doubt the extent of the prescription drug problem in the United States,
few people see the actual impact outside of incomprehensible
statistics and nightly news graphics. These large numbers do not
demonstrate the full extent of the problem. The opioid abuse problem
has become so prevalent and pervasive that an alarming number of
newborns enter this world addicted to narcotics, a syndrome known as

* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, American University Washington College of Law;
M.P.P. Candidate, May 2015, American University, the School of Public Affairs.
He thanks Prof. Lewis Grossman for his continual guidance on this endeavor.
1
See Prescription Drug Abuse Statistics, CENTER FOR LAWFUL ACCESS (2014),
http://CLAAD.org/rx-drug-abuse-stats [hereinafter Prescription Drug Abuse
Statistics].
2
See id.
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neonatal abstinence syndrome (“NAS”).3 East Tennessee Children’s
Hospital in Knoxville, TN diagnoses two-dozen newborns with NAS
daily.4 In 2009, over 13,500 newborns were diagnosed with NAS –
about one newborn every hour.5 Despite strong evidence of
widespread abuse, doctors prescribe prescription painkillers to one out
of every three Tennesseans each year.6 Tennessee represents just one
example of the nationwide prescription drug abuse epidemic.7
Despite having reached epic proportions, the abuse of
prescription drugs is not a new phenomenon. For the last century, the
U.S. Government has attempted to curtail the abuse of prescription
drugs through several laws and regulations.8
Despite the
Government’s efforts, the abuse of prescription drugs has tripled in
the last two decades.9 At present rates, fatal overdoses from
prescription drug abuse have surpassed those of cocaine and heroin,
combined,10 constituting three-quarters of U.S. drug overdose
deaths.11 In 2010, approximately one hundred Americans died from
prescription drug overdose every day.12 Worldwide, more than half of
3

See JoNel Aleccia, ‘Just Flooding Us’: Tenn. Spike in Drug-Dependent
Newborns is Warning to Nation, NBC NEWS (October 11, 2013, 7:15 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/just-flooding-us-tenn-spike-drug-dependentnewborns-warning-nation-8C11375654.
4
See id. (noting that at times the number reaches three to four dozen daily).
5
See id. (citing Stephen W. Patrick, et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and
Associated Health Care Expenditures: United States, 2000-2009, 18 JAMA 1934
(2012)).
6
See Dennis Thompson, Study Finds 1 in 3 Tennesseans Uses Narcotic
Painkillers
Each
Year,
HEALTH.COM
(March
3,
2014),
http://news.health.com/2014/03/03/study-finds-1-in-3-tennesseans-uses-narcoticpainkillers-each-year/.
7
See Prescription Drug Abuse Statistics, supra note 1 (noting that the Centers
for Disease Control declared prescription drug abuse an epidemic).
8
See Amel Ahmed, Painkiller Addiction Worst Drug Epidemic in US History,
AL
JAZEERA,
August
30,
2013,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/29/painkiller-killmorepeoplethanmarijuanause.html.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
See Barry Meier, F.D.A. Urges Tighter Rein on Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES,
October 24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/business/fdaseeks-tighter-control-on-prescriptions-for-class-of-painkillers.html?r=0.
12
See Fact Sheet: Opioid Abuse in the United States, OFF. NAT’L DRUG
CONTROL
POL’Y,
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the 78,000 drug-use deaths resulted from prescription painkiller abuse
in that same year.13 Notably, the “United States consumes 80% of the
world’s painkiller supply.”14 The Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) has acknowledged it is “failing miserably” to solve this
growing problem.15
The prescription drug problem has also affected the
pharmaceutical industry, an undoubtedly less sympathetic victim than
the Tennessee infants, with its $180 billion U.S. market.16 Under
current FDA regulations, a manufacturer may not market its
potentially addictive New Chemical Entity (“NCE”) until the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) has “scheduled” the drug,
listing it in one of five legal categories by which the DEA may
exercise its enforcement powers.17 However, the current black market
for “designer drugs,” chemical entities comparable to already
regulated drugs, has backlogged the DEA so much that it is unable to
schedule legitimate drugs in a timely fashion.18 As of September 9,
2013, FDA-approved products constituted only four out of the thirty
chemical entities docketed for scheduling.19 The average time
between FDA approval of an NCE and DEA’s completion of
scheduling is now 237.6 days.20
The prescription drug abuse problem has not gone unnoticed
by the FDA. For example, in October 2013 the FDA recommended
that the DEA reschedule the narcotic hydrocodone (Lortab) as a
Schedule II drug, placing it under greater supply and prescription
restrictions.21 If the DEA follows the recommendation, which it tends
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/opioids_fact_sheet
.pdf.
13
Ahmed, supra note 8.
14
Id.
15
See id.
16
See CARL L. HART, DRUGS, SOCIETY, & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 55 (15th ed.
2013).
17
See In re: Eisai Inc., Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, No. 13-1243, at 5
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2013) [hereafter Petition for Mandamus].
18
See In re: Eisai Inc., Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, No. 13-1243 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2013) (Declaration of Joseph
Rannazzisi appended to the Response ¶22) [hereinafter DEA Response].
19
See id. (Declaration of Joseph Rannazzisi appended to the Response ¶23).
20
See Petition for Mandamus, at 17.
21
See generally Meier, supra note 11.
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to do,22 prescriptions of hydrocodone will be limited to ninety-day
supplies per doctor’s visit, requiring chronic pain patients to see their
doctors more frequently. This potential regulation will have widereaching effects, as doctors prescribe approximately five billion pills
of hydrocodone each year for pain.23
In light of the 2007 Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act (“FDAAA”), the FDA’s reliance on the DEA seems
unreasonable and unnecessary. The FDAAA gave the Agency the
power to regulate potentially harmful pharmaceuticals through Risk
Evaluation and Management Strategies (“REMS”).24 These REMS
allow the FDA to restrict distribution and prescription methods under
its own power rather than relying on the DEA. While the DEA may
be required to reschedule drugs like hydrocodone to increase its own
enforcement power over the drug, the FDA can move quickly in the
interim to begin to stem the tide of this growing epidemic.
This article recommends that the U.S. Congress rework
existing legislation to allow the FDA to run scheduling procedures for
itself rather than relying on the DEA to work through its back log of
knockoff prescription drugs. This recommendation arises from a
careful analysis of the FDA’s approach to pharmaceuticals, including
opium and heroin, since the enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs
Act of 1906 until the creation of the DEA under the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 in Section II. Section II also details the
FDA’s new power under its REMS Regime. Section III details the
breadth and scope of the pharmaceutical abuse and designer drug
problems, demonstrating how this problem affects the DEA’s
resources by analyzing scheduling delays for Eisai Inc.’s Fycompa.
Section IV then analyzes the different options before the FDA,
recognizing the need to move life-saving drugs onto the market
cautiously to prevent further abuse.
Ultimately, this article
22

Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 11 (noting that the DEA has
followed every HHS scheduling recommendation since 1997).
23
See Meier, supra note 11 (noting that the rescheduling has been opposed by
lobbying groups such as the American Cancer Society and National Community
Pharmacist Association due to the burden placed on patients).
24
See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1; see also Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (January 28, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatient
sandProviders/ucm111350.htm.
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recommends that the FDA schedule drugs on its own behalf.
Alternatively, this article suggests that the FDA and DEA could enter
into joint rulemaking to pool their resources for more efficient
scheduling of potentially abusive drugs.
A. Definitions
The DEA’s scheduling delays result not only from FDAapproved drugs, but also from designer drugs, which are chemical
knockoffs of FDA approved drugs. This brief section will define each
drug category to clarify the following discussion.
Prescription Drugs. Generally, prescription drugs subject to
abuse come in three broad categories: opioid painkillers, anti-anxiety
medication and sedatives, and stimulants.25
Analgesic opioid
painkillers, more commonly called narcotics, are derived from the
opium poppy. Common narcotics prescriptions include morphine,
OxyCotin, Vicodin, and Demorol.26 Notably, this category also
includes “illicit drugs” like heroin. Legally, “narcotic” does not
denote a chemical definition but a statutory one. For instance, while
cocaine is not chemically a narcotic, the U.S. government classifies it
as one for enforcement and punishment purposes.27 Anti-anxiety
medications and sedatives include Xanax, Valium, and Ambien.
These types of drugs are used to treat both anxiety and sleep
disorders.28 Stimulants, which treat ADHD and certain sleep
disorders, include Ritalin and Adderall.29
Designer Drugs. Designer drugs are chemical knockoffs that
resemble legally scheduled drugs. Designer drugs are referred to by
many names, including research chemicals, bath salts, plant foods,

25

See Prescription Drugs & Cold Medicine, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE
(March 2014), http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/prescription-drugs.
26
See id.
27
See C.B. Schultz, Statutory Classification of Cocaine as a Narcotic: An
Illogical Anachronism, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (1983) (noting that statutory
definition allows law enforcement to imposes greater penalties on cocaine than
other non-narcotic drugs).
28
See Prescription Drug Abuse, THE MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/prescription-drugabuse/basics/definition/CON-20032471?p=1.
29
See Prescription Drugs & Cold Medicine, supra note 25.
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incense, and plants.30 These unscheduled chemical entities elude
DEA enforcement as they are outside of the agency’s jurisdiction until
it completes its final rule after the notice and comment period.31
These substances include synthetic marijuana and chemicals that
“mimic cocaine, LSD, and other drugs.”32 These designer drugs are
extremely pervasive and, at times, subject to much hysteria. For
example, at least 124 variations of cannabinoid products, known as
K2 or “spice,” were in circulation in 2012.33 In late 2013, the
rumored “flesh-eating zombie drug” krokodil made its way from
Russia to the United States. The drug itself is a combination of
codeine, gasoline, red phosphorus, and hydrochloric acid. Ultimately,
the rumors about its potential effects appear to be unfounded.34
II.

FDA’S ENFORCEMENT HISTORY AND THE GROWING DRUG
PROBLEM

This section addresses the historical underpinnings to the
present problem of drug enforcement in the United States. When
Congress created the Food and Drug Administration in 1906, the
Agency took direct control over narcotic enforcement in the United
States.35 Until the passage of the Controlled Substances Act, the
FDA, through its many statutes, regulated how drugs, both
prescription and over the counter, made their way into the U.S.
market. This section details the United States Government’s
30

See Bertha K. Madras, Designer Drugs: An Escalating Public Health
Challenge, 6 J. GLOBAL HEALTH POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (Sept. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.globaldrugpolicy.org/Issues/Vol%206%20Issue%203/Designer%20Dru
gs%20FINAL%20V6%20formatted.pdf.
31
See id.
32
D.E.A. Cracks Down on Designer Drug Operations, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/dea-cracks-down-ondesigner-drug-operations.html?r=0.
33
Madras, supra note 22, at 5.
34
Jacob Sullum, Krokodil Crock: How Rumors Of A 'Flesh-Eating Zombie
Drug'
Swept
The Nation,
FORBES
(Jan.
10,
2014,
7:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/01/10/krokodil-crock-how-rumorsof-a-flesh-eating-zombie-drug-swept-the-nation/.
35
Centennial
of
FDA,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/CentennialofFDA/default.htm
(last updated May 13, 2009).
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enforcement power over narcotics and associated entities from the
creation of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 to the passage of the
Controlled Substances Act. This section concludes by addressing the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act and the power given
to the FDA to curtail the distribution of prescription drugs.
A.

A History of Drug Enforcement Through the Twentieth Century
1. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906

The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 190636 (“1906 Act”) marks
one of the first attempts by the United States Government to curtail
the use of narcotics domestically.37 At the beginning of the twentieth
century, many ailments, including headaches and alcoholism, were
treated with many different types of remedies that were often laced
with addictive substance like cocaine, morphine, and heroin.38
Despite the Government’s influence on the market, the 1906 Act did
not outright criminalize the possession or use of narcotics. The 1906
Act allowed the federal government to exercise jurisdiction over
chemicals that were “misbranded or adulterated.”39 Congress defined
drug as “any substance or mixture of substance intended to be used
for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease.”40
Congress did not intend to prevent the admittance of these
drugs onto the market, but wanted to ensure that the consumers were
able to “determine the identity of the article, possibly, including its
36

Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
Notably this is the first example of legislation concerning the sale of
narcotics, but not the first attempt to regulate narcotics in the domestic market. The
Tariff Act of 1832 mentions opium, the first mention of a narcotic. The Tariff Act
prevented duties on the import trade of opium. However, ten years later opium was
added to the import list at seventy-five cents per pound. Morphine was added to the
list in 1862 at two dollars per pound. See Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T.
McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 CATH. U. L.
REV. 586, 589-90 (1973).
38
See id. at 591.
39
See HART, supra note 16, at 53-54 (noting that the Pure Food and Drug Act
was administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
40
Compare Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, with The Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act § 201(g)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(b) (1938) (“articles intended
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man
or animals”).
37
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strength, quality, and purity.”41 Ultimately, the 1906 Act intended to
protect consumers from “unscrupulous merchants” rather than to
protect the consumers from themselves.42 The Act required producers
of remedies containing alcohol, morphine, cocaine, heroin, or any
derivatives of these drugs to clearly indicate their presence in the
labeling or be deemed misbranded.43 Although the sale of remedies
containing these narcotics dropped thirty-three percent after the Act’s
passage, the 1906 Act did not outlaw the possession, sale, or use of
any of the above-mentioned narcotics.44 In fact, following the 1906
Act, pharmacies continued to sell heroin by its common name as well
as morphine, opium, and cocaine over the counter.45 While the act
created public awareness of the potential dangers associated with
these drugs, “a 1910 pharmaceutical journal reported that one drug
store earned a profit of $60 a day from sales of cocaine alone.”46
2. The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914
The Government expanded its regulation of the sale and
distribution of narcotic drugs through the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act

41

United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497 (1911); see also PETER B. HUTT,
RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 641-42, 644 (4th ed. 2014).
42
HART, supra note 12, at 53; See also PETER B. HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL,
& LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 468 (3d ed.
2007) (quoting PETER B. HUTT, The Regulation of Drug Products by the United
States Food and Drug Administration, in THE TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MEDICINE (John P. Griffen & John O’Grady, eds., 5th ed. 2006) (“Although it was
quite short, and very broad and general in nature, it was extremely progressive for
its time and included sufficient authority to permit FDA to take strong enforcement
action against the unsafe, ineffective, and mislabeled products that flooded the
United States market in the late 1800s.”).
43
See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 591 (noting that any
confectionary containing a narcotic substance was also considered adulterated under
the 1906 Act); see also Hart, supra note 12, at 55 (noting that when brought to
litigation, the Government had the burden of showing that the labeling claim was
not only false but known to be false by the manufacturer).
44
See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL 22 (3d. ed. 1999).
45
See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 591 (noting that the “sale of
these drugs continued to flourish”).
46
Id.

Frisina Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

246

Loyola Consumer Law Review

3/16/15 7:10 PM

Vol. 27:2

of 1914 (“Harrison Act”).47 Initially, in a coordinated effort with the
Chinese, the Harrison Act intended to curtail the import of opium.48
At the time, the British had a very large, controlling share of the
opium market. In a 1912 meeting of the world’s biggest economies at
the Hague International Opium Convention, the British government
agreed to restrict imports of opium so long as morphine, heroin, and
cocaine were added to the restricted list— an effort to limit the
German hold on those markets. The nations agreed.49 Prior to the
meeting, the Secretary of the Treasury already had authorization to
limit the importation of opium, usually only for medical use.
Congress eventually outlawed the import and export of all “smoking
opium” while “heavily taxing its domestic manufacture”50 through the
Narcotic Drug Export Act.51
With the Harrison Act, Congress moved to drastically regulate
narcotics in the domestic market. The Act itself allowed the Treasury
Department to oversee opioids52 and cocaine from the time of their
importation or manufacture until the products were ultimately used.53
Through the Act, Congress and the Treasury Department required
dispensaries of opioids to “register annually, pay a small fee, and use
special order forms provided by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.”54
Furthermore, the Harrison Act limited prescriptions of opioids to
patients who had undergone an examination and received a diagnosis
by a physician.55 Congress feared that pharmacists would create

47

Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
See HART, supra note 16, at 54; Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 592.
49
See id.
50
See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 592.
51
38 Stat. 275 (1914).
52
Opioids are used primarily for pain relief. “They reduce the intensity of pain
signals reaching the brain and affect those brain areas controlling emotion, which
diminishes the effects of a painful stimulus.” What are Opioids?, NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE (October 2011), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/researchreports/prescription-drugs/opioids/what-are-opioids.
53
See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 593.
54
HART, supra note 16, at 54; Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 593
(noting that Congress choose to assert its power through its revenue powers rather
than through the Commerce Power).
55
See Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); Jin Fuey Moy v. United
States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920).
48
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dispensaries to continue to distribute drugs to anyone and everyone.56
The Act allowed doctors to prescribe the narcotics, but only to their
patients.57
Later amendments to the Harrison Act in 1914 criminalized
the sale, purchase, or distribution of opioids, cocaine, or their
compounds not sold in the original stamped packages. The lack of
adequate packaging was prima facie illegal. The annual tax was also
increased.58 Notably, the notion of a blanket prohibition and
criminalized possession would have been considered anathema to the
general public and would not have likely withstood Supreme Court
scrutiny.59
Congress continued to limit the importation and distribution of
narcotic products through the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act of
1922 (“Import-Export Act”). The Import-Export Act continued the
import ban on opium from the Narcotic Drug Export Act, but also
added cocaine to the banned list. As with Schedule I drugs today, the
Government did allow small quantities to enter the country for
medical uses and other “legitimate” needs.60 The Act was later
amended to ban the import of opium used in the manufacture of
heroin domestically.61 Despite these efforts, drug abuse and addiction
continued to rise throughout the 1920s. By the end of the 1920s, the
Government even noted a pronounced rise in inmate addictions.62

56

See also HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 808 (“in the course
of professional practice only”).
57
See MUSTO, supra note 44, at 58; see also Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96
(1919) (holding that narcotics may only be distributed via prescription for a
legitimate medical purpose arising out of a consultation with a doctor but not for a
drug addition).
58
See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 594.
59
See HART, supra note 16, at 54; but see Musto, supra note 35, at 68 (noting
that the passage of the Constitutional amendment on prohibition also allowed
narcotic regulation under the Harrison Act to a “more prohibition style,” citing its
moral effect).
60
See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 597.
61
See id. at 597-98.
62
See id. at 599 (noting that the prison system created two “United States
Narcotic Farms” to treat patient inmates for their addictions).
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3. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
The largest and most enduring drug legislation is undoubtedly
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).63 The
Act allowed the FDA to regulate drugs for safety prior to their
emergence on the market. The final impetus for the FDCA’s
enactment involved a toxic drug named “Elixir Sulfanilamide.” The
drug was an effective antibiotic with one harmful and deadly side
effect—kidney poisoning. Ultimately, the “Elixir” lead to 107 deaths,
the largest fine ever to arise from the 1906 Act, and the creator’s
suicide. The resulting public crisis demonstrated the need for safety
controls.64
Before 1938, the FDA had no premarket approval power over
drugs. The Agency could only take post-market enforcement action
against drugs that were considered adulterated or misbranded.
Notably, the premarket notification created by the FDCA still required
a New Drug Application (“NDA”) but was not an approval process.
The application simply allowed the NDA to say “yes” or “no” to the
new drug. The NDA required the producer to prove that its drug was
not toxic by including “full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such a drug is safe for use.”65
The FDCA had profound effects on the drug market in the
United States. First, the Act placed the FDA in a key position to
guard the market from potentially dangerous drugs. While the Act
only allowed the FDA to approve or deny the drug based on the
limited safety materials presented, the FDCA greatly expanded the
FDA’s power to enforce its new mandates. Undoubtedly the safety
requirement kept many drugs off the market that would have normally
been available for public use.66

63

21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
See HART, supra note 16, at 56 (“There was no legal requirement that
medicine be safe.”); see also Rakhi B. Shah & Mansoor A. Khan, The Evolution of
FDA’s Role in Ensuring Product Quality, 31.7 PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY 52
(2007) (noting that the FDCA arose from problems arising from pharmaceutical
quality).
65
See HART, supra note 16, at 56.
66
See id. at 56. (suggesting that the FDCA’s safety requirement likely would
have prevented smaller companies run by less-trained researchers from having a
competitive position in the market if able to have a position at all).
64
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Between 1938 and 1962, the effectiveness of the drug was not
an explicit factor in NDA approval decisions. A company had to only
show that its drug was safe.67 Although not a requirement,
effectiveness snuck into the approval process before 1962, though not
as a formal matter.68 The FDCA required approved drugs to be
accompanied by labeling that “contain[ed] adequate information for
safe and effective use of the drug.”69 The FDA exercised its power to
enforce the effectiveness of drugs through its misbranding provision,
FDCA § 502(a). 70
Second, the FDCA required that labeling contain either
instructions (“adequate directions”) for use or to specify if the drug
should be used only after receiving a prescription from a doctor.
Notably, the FDA read its new powers to indicate that drugs did not
require labels if they were meant for prescription since there was no
risk to public health.71 The problem, however, was that the FDCA did
not indicate which drugs should only be prescription, and which
should be over-the-counter! Ultimately, the drug companies decided
for themselves whether their drugs were prescription or not, under the
threat of the now robust FDA’s power to label a drug misbranded if
the Agency happened to disagree with the company’s decision.72 By
1941 FDA selected twenty drugs or drug groups that could only be
sold with a written prescription from a doctor or a dentist, including
barbiturates and amphetamines.73
67

See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 615
(1973) (“the 1938 Act permitted evaluation of a new drug solely on the grounds of
its safety”).
68
See United States v. 62 Packages, More or Less, of Marmola Prescription
Tablets, 48 F.Supp. 878, 887 (W.D. Wis. 1943) (noting that the FDCA “was enacted
to make self-medication safer and more effective”) (emphasis added).
69
Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for
Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration: Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (August 15, 1972).
70
See e.g., United States v. 10 Cartons, Labeled in Part “Hoxsey”, 152 F.Supp.
360 (W.D. Pa. 1957); United States v. 47 Bottles, More or Less, Jenasol RJ Formula
60, 200 F.Supp. 1 (D. N.J. 1961).
71
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 803 (quoting Peter
Temin, The Origins of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 21 J.L. & ECON. 91 (1973)).
72
See id. (quoting Peter Temin, The Origins of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions,
21 J.L. & ECON. 91 (1973)).
73
See Brochure: The History of Drug Regulation in the United States, FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.,
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The FDCA marks a large step in the FDA’s control over
pharmaceuticals. Congress did not give the FDA explicit control,
acting more as a gatekeeper with limited exclusionary discretion. As
noted, the FDA did use its misbranding provisions to ensure that the
new safe drugs entering the market were also effective. While the
FDCA did not give the FDA explicit control over narcotics and habitforming drugs, the FDA certainly used the Act’s provisions to extend
its control over the market.
4. Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951
Thirteen years passed before Congress felt moved to revise
regulations concerning prescription drugs once again. The FDCA left
much to be desired by way of deciding what drugs should be
considered prescription versus over-the-counter, leading to many
conflicts between the FDA and the industry. Between 1940 and 1962,
pharmacies were undoubtedly the largest distributors of illegal drugs,
including both illicit over-the-counter sales and unauthorized refills.74
The 1951 Durham-Humphrey Amendments75 (“1951 Amendments”)
amended FDCA § 503(b) and clearly divided pharmaceuticals into
two strict categories: legend (prescription) and over-the-counter
(“OTC”). The 1951 Amendments made the act of dispensing
prescription drugs without a physician prescription a statutory
violation.76 The distinction between the categories hinges on whether
the drug may be used safely without the supervision of a doctor.77
The relevant section reads78:

http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/forgshistory/cder/centerfordrugeval
uationandresearchbrochureandchronology/ucm114470.htm (last updated June 23,
2013) (hereafter FDA Brochure).
74
FDA Brochure, supra note 73; see also MUSTO, supra note 44, at 231 (noting
that during the McCarthy-era of American politics, drug use was associated with a
Communist conspiracy to destroy Western society, even going to far as to connect
“Red China” with the influx of drugs in the domestic market).
75
Act of Oct. 26, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-214, 65 Stat. 648.
76
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 807-08.
77
See M.L. Yakowitz, The Evolution of Drug Laws in the United States, 19061964, 19 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 296, 299 (1964) (detailing the history of drug
enforcement form the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 until the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments of 1962).
78
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 805.
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(1) A drug intended for use by man which—
(A) is a habit-forming drug to which section
502(d) applies; or
(B) because of its toxicity or other potentiality
for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the
collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for
use except under the supervision of a practitioner
licensed by law to administer such drug; or
(C) is limited by an approved application under
section 505 to use under the professional supervision
of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such
drug;
shall be dispensed only [upon prescription] . . .
The act of dispensing a drug contrary to the provisions
of this paragraph shall be deemed to be an act which
results in the drug being misbranded while held for
sale.
Under the 1951 Amendments, any legend (i.e., prescription)
pharmaceutical sold without a prescription became subject to the
FDCA’s misbranding provisions in violation of 503(b)(1).79 Congress
intended the law to ensure that a drug was not sold both as a
prescription and OTC.80 Further, the Amendments required any
prescription drug to be labeled, “Caution: Federal law prohibits
dispensing without a prescription.”81 Congress changed the labeling
to “Rx Only” in 1997.82
The Durham-Humphrey Amendments marked the first time
that the Congress gave the FDA explicit power to regulate how
addictive drugs entered the market. Originally, a key factor the FDA
used to determine whether a drug was considered prescription or OTC
was whether the drug was habit-forming subject to § 502(d). Section
502(d) detailed substances known to be habit-forming, such as
cannabis, cocaine, codeine, heroin, marijuana, amongst several others.
The section also required that labeling bear the statement “Warning -79

Shah & Khan, supra note 64, at 54.
HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 805.
81
Act of Oct. 26, 1951, supra note 77, at 649.
82
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105115, § 126(b), 111 Stat. 2296, 2327; see also HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra
note 41, at 807.
80
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May be habit forming.” 83 Section 503(a)(1)(A) required a physician
prescription for any drug containing any amount of those
substances.84 Congress repealed §§ 502(d) and 503(a)(1)(A) when it
passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997.85
5. Narcotic Control Act of 1956
In an effort to deter the illegal importation and distribution of
narcotics, Congress passed the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 (“1956
Act”) in response to the growing international drug trade resulting
from safer travel after World War II.86 Through he 1956 Act,
Congress created mandatory penalties for offenders, believing the
stronger penalties would deter potential offenders from participating
in the illegal market.87 Under the 1956 Act, judges could only
sentence an offender to parole for first offenses. Second offenses,
however, required mandatory minimums for prison sentences.
Strikingly, anyone caught selling to a minor was eligible for the death
penalty.88
By the 1970s, Congress realized the absolute failure of the
minimum sentences. Then-Congressman George Bush argued that the
“minimums were ineffective and unjust.”89 Despite the calls for
repeal, Congress enacted stiffer penalties and minimums in 1984,
adding five years to any drug sentence wherein the offender carried a

83

See 21 U.S.C. §352(d) (1993).
See De Freese v. United States, 270 F.2d 730, 736 n.11 (5th Cir. 1959).
85
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 805; see also § 126(b),
111 Stat. supra note 71, at 2327.
86
See HART, supra note 16, at 62.
87
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 199, 200-01 (1993) (noting that mandatory minimums were rare in
the federal system before the Narcotic Control Act, but were stiffened every few
years after the 1970s despite calls that the minimums did not deter violations
whatsoever).
88
See JOHN C. MCWILLIAMS, THE PROTECTORS: HARRY J. ANSLINGER AND THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, 1930-1962 116 (1990); see also Musto, supra
note 35, at 242 (suggesting that the Narcotic Control Act marked the end of an era
of ever increasing punishment severity for drug violations beginning with the
passage of the Harrison Act).
89
Schulhofer, supra note 87, at 201.
84
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firearm. Congress continued to strengthen these minimums every two
years between 1986 and 1990.90
6. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965
The 1956 Narcotic Control Act had little to no effect in
deterring the growing illegal drug trade. Not only did the drug trade
continue to grow, but the emphasis changed from opioids and cocaine
to depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens such as LSD.91 In 1965,
Congress responded with the Drug Abuse Control Amendments to the
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (“1965 Amendments”).92 The 1965
Amendments allowed the FDA to prevent the illicit use of barbiturates
and amphetamines.93 While many drugs regulated under the 1965
Amendments had a legitimate medical use, the abuse of those drugs
led to a public health crisis.94 The abuse of these drugs became so
prevalent in the early 1960s that large city hospitals reported fifteen
percent of emergency room visits concerned adverse reactions to these
drugs.95
Congress wrote the 1965 Amendments with some flexibility.
While the stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens mentioned were
explicitly controlled, the Amendments allowed the Commissioner of
the FDA to add any drug which the Commissioner deemed to be
habit-forming or had the potential for abuse due to its stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic nature. The bill also allowed exceptions
to the Act for drugs that can be legally distributed without a
prescription, combinations with other drugs “where the Secretary
finds that the combination does not have the effect at which the bill is
aimed,” or those “whose regulation the Secretary finds not necessary
90

See id. at 201.
See HART, supra note 16, at 63; see also Significant Dates in U.S. Food and
Drug
Law
History,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/milestones/ucm128305.htm
(last
updated Dec. 19, 2014).
92
Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226 (1965); see also Harold F. O’Keefe,
Compliance with the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, 21 FOOD DRUG &
COSM. L.J. 360 (1966) (noting that the 1965 Amendments were widely popular with
the pharmaceutical industry and Congress, passing with an almost unanimous vote).
93
HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 808.
94
See O’Keefe, supra note 92, at 361.
95
See HART, supra note 16, at 64.
91
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for protection of the public health.”96 Furthermore, the 1965
Amendments prohibited anyone outside of his or her normal practice
to transport, sell, or distribute any stimulant or depressant. Finally,
any producer or distributor of the regulated drugs was required to
register with the FDA to comply with the Amendments.
Penalties under the 1965 Amendments were not as stringent as
the 1956 Narcotic Control Act. FDCA § 303 (a) provided that an
individual convicted of possession could not receive more than a
$1,000 fine or one-year imprisonment.97 The Amendments included a
provision stating that any person eighteen years of age who sells or
dispenses any hallucinogen, stimulant, or depressant to another under
the age of twenty-one will be fined no more than $5,000, sentenced to
two years in prison, or both. A second violation of the 1965
Amendments resulted in an increased fine of no more than $15,000, or
a sentence of no more than six years in prison, or both.98 Notably, the
1965 Amendments also allowed the Secretary to designate employees
for enforcement, creating FDCA §702(e). These new enforcement
employees may carry a gun, execute and serve search and arrest
warrants, execute seizures, and make warrantless arrest when a drug
offense occurs in front them.99 The segments of § 303(a) that were
amended in 1965 are no longer law. Congress folded penalties for
possession of prescription and illegal drugs into the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in 1970.100
The 1965 Amendments also included provisions to prohibit
the manufacture of counterfeit drugs.101
In enacting these
amendments, Congress noted that these drugs posed a serious threat to
public health, as they were not manufactured under the same
conditions as FDA-approved drugs. The Amendments placed the
counterfeit drugs under the misbranding provisions of the FDCA.102
The “counterfeit drug” definition remains in the current version of
FDCA § 201(g)(2). For the purposes of this discussion, the
manufacture of designer drugs, would likely fall under this provision
96

O’Keefe, supra note 92, at 361.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(a)(1) (2012).
98
See Pub. L. No. 89-74 § 7, 79 Stat. 227, 233 (1965).
99
See id. at 234.
100
See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-865.
101
See Pub. L. No. 89-74 § 9, 79 Stat. 227, 234-35 (1965).
102
See id. at 234.
97
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as a drug that “falsely purports or is represented to be the product of . .
. such other drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor.”
7. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act –
The Hatch-Waxman Act
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
(“Hatch-Waxman”) has nothing to do with the regulation of
prescription drugs or narcotic enforcement.103 However, patent
restoration and market exclusivity are fundamental to understanding
the policy options that I will present later in this paper. As such, we
will take a few moments to discuss them here.
The Hatch-Waxman Act allows “generic drugs” to forgo the
clinical trials required by pioneer manufacturer’s brand-name drug.
The Act allows generic companies to develop a cheaper version of a
brand-name drug inexpensively by submitting an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA). The ANDA uses the pioneer drug’s
clinical trials to prove safety and effectiveness. The generic company
then only has to show that its drug is bioequivalent to the pioneer.104
In return, the pioneer drug company receives five years of market
exclusivity. After the FDA approves the pioneer New Chemical
Entity (“NCE”), the FDA cannot approve a generic of the pioneer
drug for a period of five years. Companies that undertake an
Investigational New Drug Application (“INDA”) may also apply for
patent term extension equivalent to half of the investigational period.
The extension cannot exceed five years. The total market exclusivity
period may not exceed fourteen years.105
B.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act – Direct
Enforcement and Scheduling

Despite recent changes in federal drug law, “the patch-work of
laws and amendments that built up over the years since the 1914
Harrison Act [needed] major reform.”106 Congress started anew when
103

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 1002.
105
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact
on the Drug Development Process, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 187, 189-90 (1999).
106
HART, supra note 16, at 63.
104
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it enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Act in 1970. 107
First, the Act provided additional funding for the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”). HHS would use this funding
for research, treatment, and prevention of narcotic drug abuse.
Second, direct drug enforcement would fall under the new Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) under the Department of
Justice. The Act removed mandatory minimums and laws that could
result in capital punishment for pure drug crimes.108 Furthermore, the
DEA now controlled how specific drugs would fall under the
provisions of the Act, removing enforcement from the political
arena.109
The best-known section of the 1970 Act is the Controlled
Substances Act110 (CSA). The CSA created a “uniform structure for
classifying drugs of abuse and regulating their manufacture,
distribution, and use in medical studies,” which is enforced primarily
through the DEA.111 Section 812(b) created the classifications, called
“Schedules,” to reflect a drug’s potential for abuse, presence of a
legitimate medical use, and addictiveness. Scheduling brings the
drugs under the jurisdiction of the DEA so that it may “prohibit[] the
manufacture, sale, or possession for recreational use of any substance
it controls.”112
Classification under the Controlled Substances Act113
Abuse
Medical
Safety and
Examples114
Potential
Use
Dependence
Schedule
High
No
Lack of
Heroin
I
potential currently
accepted
Marijuana

107

21 U.S.C. § 801 (2014).
Contra Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-278, 70 Stat. 567
(1956) (allowing distribution to a minor to be treated as a capital crime).
109
See HART, supra note 16, at 63 (noting that this is arguably a more liberal
approach to drug enforcement).
110
21 U.S.C. § 811 (2014).
111
ALEX KREIT, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: CRIME, REGULATION, AND POLICY
627 (2013) [hereinafter KREIT (book)].
112
Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances; Uncontrolled Law, 6 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV, 332, 336 (2013) [hereinafter Kreit (article)].
113
See KREIT (book), supra note 111, at 627.
114
See HART, supra note 16, at 64.
108
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MDMA

Has a
High
currently Abuse may
Morphine
Schedule
potential accepted lead to severe
Cocaine
II
for abuse medical
dependence Methamphetamine
use
Abuse may
lead to
Potential
Has a
moderate or
for abuse currently
Anabolic steroids
Schedule
low physical
less than accepted
Most Barbiturates
III
dependence
Schedules medical
THC
or high
I and II
use
psychological
dependence
Low
Abuse may
Has a
potential
lead to
currently
Schedule for abuse
limited
Xanax
accepted
IV
relative to
dependence
Ambien
medical
Schedule
relative to
use
III
Schedule III
Low
Abuse may
Has a
potential
lead to
currently
Mixtures having
Schedule for abuse
limited
accepted
small amounts of
V
relative to
dependence
medical
cocaine or opium
Schedule
relative to
use
IV
Schedule IV
Implicit to this system is the recognition that many addictive drugs
have legitimate medical uses.115 Note that the primary difference
between Schedule I and II is a “legitimate medical use.” When the
DEA enters rulemaking to schedule a drug, it will consider whether
the substance in question is used “by a substantial segment of medical

115

See Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55 (2003).
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practitioners in the United States” for such a use.116 Notably, the CSA
does not require the DEA to perform any research to evaluate
potential medical use when rulemaking.117 Consequently, if the DEA
classifies a drug as Schedule I, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for
medical professionals to attain quantities of the drug for testing and
research.118 The CSA provides for eight considerations the DEA must
examine when scheduling during its rulemaking procedures. All three
classifications—potential for abuse, legitimate medical purpose, and
addictiveness—are determined by these eight factors:
“(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. (2)
Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if
known. (3) The state of current scientific knowledge
regarding the drug or other substance. (4) Its history
and current pattern of abuse. (5) The scope, duration,
and significance of abuse. (6) What, if any, risk there
is to the public health. (7) Its psychic or physiological
dependence liability. (8) Whether the substance is an
immediate precursor of a substance already controlled
under this subchapter.”119
Notably, these factors are only considerations. The CSA does
not require any written record of the considerations when the DEA
performs its rulemaking procedures, though the DEA maintains the
practice of a “written discussion of the eight factors.”120

116

Schedules
of
Controlled
Substances;
Scheduling
of
3,4Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) Into Schedule I of the Controlled
Substances Act; Remand, 53 Fed. Reg. 5156-01, 5157-58 (1998) (detailing the
rationale behind scheduling for medical use) (codified in 21 C.F.R. 1308).
117
See KREIT (book), supra note 111, at 683.
118
See id. (detailing the extreme difficulty facing researchers who petition the
DEA for drug rescheduling); see also Kreit (article), supra note 112, at
356 (noting that the rationale behind restricting research access to Schedule I
drugs appear to be a fear that abusers will break in laboratories to access the drugs–a
fear that seems ridiculous in light of the prevalence of other Schedule I drugs on the
black market).
119
Kreit (article), supra note 112, at 345 (quoting United States v. Pastor, 419
F. Supp. 1318, 1339 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)); 21 U.S.C. § 811(c).
120
Kreit (article), supra note 112, at 347 (noting that United States v. Pastor
held that the DEA did not have to make a written record of its consideration of these
factors).
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The CSA puts a number of restrictions on the manufacture and
distribution of scheduled substances beyond those mandated by the
FDCA. First, any manufacturer or distributor of a scheduled drug
must register with the Attorney General.121 Subsection (a) requires a
separate registration for the manufacture and distribution of Schedule
I drugs.122
The Attorney General’s primary consideration in
determining whether to register a manufacturer or distributor is the
establishment and maintenance of effective controls against illegal
distribution.123
The CSA also limits prescriptions based on scheduling.
Schedules II-IV may only be dispensed for a legitimate medical
purpose through an oral or written prescription by a practitioner,
except in emergency situations.124 The CSA allows Schedule III and
IV drugs to be refilled up to five times in a six-month period. 125
Schedule II drugs, however, may not be refilled.126 The DEA recently
promulgated a rule allowing doctors to write three prescriptions for
Schedule II substances per patient visit to bypass the no-refill rule.127
Schedule V is restricted only to legitimate medical purposes.128
The CSA provides for specific penalties for possession of
specific drugs. Penalties also vary by the amount in possession. For
example, possession of one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of coca
leaves, cocaine, ecgonine, or any combination thereof, 100 grams of
PCP, ten grams of LSD, 1000 kilograms of marijuana, or fifty grams
of methamphetamine carries a sentence of no less than ten years
imprisonment and not more than life imprisonment.129 If serious
bodily injury or death results from a violator’s distribution or use, the
penalty jumps to no less than twenty years but not more than life.130
While possession or use of 100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of coca
121

See 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)-(b).
See 21 U.S.C. § 822(a).
123
See 21 U.S.C. § 823.
124
21 U.S.C. § 829(a)-(b).
125
21 U.S.C. § 829(b).
126
21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (“No prescription for a controlled substance in schedule
II may be refilled.”).
127
See Issuance Of Multiple Prescriptions For Schedule II Controlled
Substances, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,921 (Nov. 19, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1306).
128
See 21 U.S.C. § 829(c).
129
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).
130
See § 841(b)(1)(A).
122
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leaves, cocaine, ecgonine, or any combination thereof, twenty-eight
grams of PCP, one gram of LSD, 100 kilograms of marijuana, or five
grams of methamphetamine mandates only a sentence of no less than
five years but not more than forty years.131 As with the larger
quantities, any distribution or use that results in serious bodily harm
or death is subject to larger penalties—no less than twenty years but
not more than life.132
The CSA also imposes penalties based on the possession, use,
or distribution of scheduled drugs not specifically listed. The chart
below details the CSA breakdown:
CSA Criminal Penalties133
Penalty with death
Schedule (and
134
Penalty
or serious bodily
additional drugs)
injury
Schedule I and II, as
well as flunitrazepam
No less than 20
(Rohypnol, or
No more than 20
years, but not more
“roofies”) and gamma
years
than life
hydroxybutyric acid
(GHB)
No more than 10
No more than 15
Schedule III
years
years
Schedule IV
No more than 5 years
N/A
Schedule IV
No more than 1 year
N/A
< 50 grams of
No more than 5 years
N/A
marijuana
As with the Acts that preceded the CSA, distribution to
another under the age of twenty-one subjects the violator to greater
penalties. The Act allows the courts to double a violator’s sentence
for a first offense if he or she distributes to another under the age of
twenty-one.135 A second conviction of distribution to another under

131

See § 841(b)(1)(B).
See id.
133
See § 841(b)(1)(B)-(E).
134
This penalty only concerns for first offenses.
135
See § 859.
132
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the age of twenty-one allows the court to impose a penalty not
exceeding three times the maximum amount allowed by § 841.136
The DEA has an obligation to consult with the FDA before
scheduling FDA-approved drugs.137 For scientific and medical
matters, the DEA is bound by the FDA’s recommendation. 21 U.S.C.
§ 811(b) prevents the DEA from scheduling a drug if the FDA
recommends against the procedure.138
However, if the FDA
recommends the placement of a drug into a specific section, the DEA
is not bound by this recommendation but must make its own
determination.139 Notably, the DEA has not disagreed with the FDA’s
recommended schedule since 1997.140 If the FDA recommends
scheduling, the Agency prohibits the manufacturer from marking its
new drug upon FDA approval if the DEA has not completed its
rulemaking.141 If the FDA finds in its initial review of the NDA that
the drug has the potential for addiction or abuse, the Agency will
make a scheduling recommendation to the DEA based on the same
criteria that the DEA will use in its rulemaking. Although, the DEA
and FDA must work together in determining scheduling,142 the
agencies have very different goals concerning narcotics.143
C. Risk Evaluation and Management Strategies (“REMS”)
In the same way that Congress recognized that many
potentially addictive drugs have very beneficial effects on the body in
1971, Congress again realized that many very beneficial drugs also
have enormous risks associated with them in 2007. The 2007 Food
136

See § 859(b).
See § 811(b)
138
HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 810.
139
Cf. § 811(b) (noting that if the Secretary of Health and Human Services
recommends a specific classification or the declassification of a substance, the
Attorney General shall initial rulemaking in consideration of the Secretary’s
recommendation).
140
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 11, 30.
141
See Form FDA 356h, at 3 (Apr. 2013), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/ucm0
82348.pdf ("If this application applies to a drug product that FDA has proposed for
scheduling under the [CSA], I agree not to market the product until the [DEA]
makes a final scheduling decision.").
142
See 70 Fed. Reg. 73775 (Dec. 13, 2005).
143
See KREIT (Book), supra note 111, at 687.
137

Frisina Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

262

Loyola Consumer Law Review

3/16/15 7:10 PM

Vol. 27:2

and Drug Administration Amendments Act (“FDAAA”) authorizes
the FDA to require NDA applicants to submit a Risk Evaluation and
Mitigations Strategies (“REMS”) report with their NDAs to ensure
that the benefits of any potentially risky drug actually outweigh its
risks.144 At a minimum, the REMS regime requires the company to
submit safety assessment at eighteen months, three years, and seven
years.145 The FDAAA also authorizes the FDA to require that the
NDA applicant include the REMS report in its labeling.146
Ultimately, the FDAAA allows the FDA, under certain safety
conditions, to approve risky drugs that would have otherwise been
forbidden to enter into or would have otherwise been removed from
the market.147
Before the 2007 enactment of the REMS regime, the FDA had
little power to impose distribution controls over approved
pharmaceuticals.
In American Pharmaceutical Association v.
Weinberger,148 the district court struck down an FDA regulation
restricting methadone distribution to hospital pharmacies,149 stating
that the FDA “could not restrict distribution as a condition of
approving an NDA.”150 The FDA found a mechanism to restrict
distribution as a condition of its accelerated approval process. If the
manufacturer refused to comply with the restricted distribution, the
FDA would simply deny the accelerated approval application.151
Manufacturers could also impose limitations on themselves. In the
case of Acutane®, the manufacturer required pharmacist education
programs and registration with the company.152 The limitations also
required females to sign an informed consent form and agree to use
two forms of birth control before, during, and after using the drug.153
144

21 U.S.C. § 355-1.
Id. at § 355-1(d).
146
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 829.
147
See Andrew Wilson & Christopher-Paul Milne, FDA’s Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Effective and Safety Tools or Process Poltergeist?,
66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569, 571 (2011).
148
377 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1974).
149
See Approved New Drugs Requiring Continuation of Long-Term Studies, 37
Fed. Reg. 26790 (Dec. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130)
150
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 828.
151
See id.
152
See id.
153
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 828.
145
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The REMS provisions can require specific types of
communications to inform both practitioners and patients of potential
risks as an additional step.154 The REMS can require Medication
Guides (“Med Guides”), patient-labeling inserts, and communication
plans for providers.155 The Med Guides instruct patients on how to
use the potentially risky substance effectively to avoid adverse
events.156 The communication plans may involve either direct mail or
conference presentations, amongst other avenues, to communicate
risks to practitioners.157
Beyond active communication, the FDA may restrict
distribution to ensure safe use of the drug.158 The FDA must address
any specific side effect listed in the labeling.159 Section (f)(3) details
the requirements that the FDA may place on REMS-covered drugs160:
1) Health care providers must have particular training or experience;
2) Pharmacies or other dispensaries must be specially certified; 3)
Dispensed only in certain healthcare conditions; 4) Dispensed only
with evidence of safe-use conditions (e.g., pregnancy testing before
administration); 5) Subjecting the patient to certain monitoring; and 6)
Enrolling each patient in a registry for the drug.161
Components of REMS Outlined in FDA Guidance162
A. “Minimal Strategy”
C. Elements to Assure Safe Use
All REMS must include a
May include one or more of the
timetable for assessment at
following:
defined intervals:
*Special training and/or
* 18 months
certification requirements for
* 3 years
prescribers or dispensers of the
* 7 years
drug;

154

21 U.S.C. § 355-1(e).
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 829 (arguing that this
is less burdensome than having to proceed through a risk-benefit analysis, citing 21
U.S.C. § 355-1(e)).
156
See Wilson & Milne, supra note 147, at 570-71.
157
See id. at 571.
158
See 21 U.S.C. §355-1(f).
159
See § 355-1(f)(3).
160
See id.
161
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 829.
162
See Wilson & Milne, supra note 147, at 571.
155
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*Restricting distribution of the
drug to particular care settings;
* Dispensing a drug based on
evidence or documentation of safe
use conditions (e.g., patient
counseling and acknowledgement
of risks and benefits, informed
consent);
* Patient monitoring and followup
(e.g., periodic lab testing);
* Use of patient registries.
Sponsors may also develop
implementation systems with
which to monitor, evaluate, and
improve implementation of
“elements to assure safe use.”

The FDA has used its REMS power to require specific
communications from producers of opioids. In 2012, FDA’s opioid
REMS required specific physician education and patient labeling
instructing on safe use of the product.163 In September 2013, the FDA
released new requirements on extended release and long-acting
opioids, requiring labeling changes for physicians to combat drug
abuse and post-market studies to ensure safe use.164 The labeling
changes indicate that opioids should be limited to chronic, round-theclock pain that cannot be reasonably treated by an alternative
means.165 The indications note that if alternatives to opioids are
available for treatment, the physician should turn to those in an effort
to prevent abuse.166 Notably, the REMS also included a boxed

163

See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 813.
See id.
165
See FDA announces safety labeling changes and postmarket study
requirements for extended-release and long-acting opioid analgesics, FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Sept.
10,
2013),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm367726.htm.
166
See id.
164
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warning indicating that opioid abuse by pregnant women may lead to
neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome in newborns.167
Regarding distribution control, the FDA’s REMS power is
extremely specific. Under the CSA, the distributor must only be
registered with the Attorney General to be allowed to distribute
Schedule II-IV drugs.168 The FDA can require that a pharmacy
wanting to distribute a particular drug obtain certification from the
drug’s company for the specific drug. With Revlimid, a drug
structurally similar to thalidomide, the REMS requires that the
pharmacist be certified for the drug before dispensing it, or in the
alternative the pharmacist may contact a Revlimid REMS-certified
pharmacy to fill the prescription to ensure compliance.169
Furthermore, the FDA can also require prescribers to register with the
FDA, duplicating the registration system in place with the DEA.170
The control of opioid abuse in the United States has evolved
over the last century, beginning with simply making consumers aware
of their presence to restricting supply through REMS restrictions.
Ultimately, the DEA has primary jurisdiction over abuse and misuse
of prescription drugs. However, as noted, the FDA now has power
similar to DEA’s scheduling procedures to limit the production and
distribution of potentially harmful and addictive pharmaceuticals.
Notably, the FDA’s history demonstrates an emphasis on protecting
public health from the misuse of narcotic drugs. The FDA’s new
REMS regime allows the FDA to move decisively to prevent abuse of
its approved drugs. The next section details why these controls are
necessary by demonstrating how the drug abuse problem has
continued to grow despite more extensive restriction.
167

Cf. Aleccia, supra note 3 (detailing the growing number of newborns born
with opioid addictions in Tennessee).
168
See 21 U.S.C. § 823(b), (d).
169
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies – Revlimid, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
at
1-2,
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformatio
nforPatientsandProviders/UCM222644.pdf (last modified Sept. 2014) [hereinafter
Revlimid].
170
Questions and Answers: FDA Requires a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy (REMS) for Long-Acting and Extended-Release Opioids, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/informationbydrugclass/ucm251752.htm (last
updated April 19, 2011).
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THE PROBLEM: NARCOTIC ABUSE, DESIGNER DRUGS, AND THE
STATUS QUO
A. Narcotic Abuse in the United States

Narcotic abuse is not a new phenomenon. As early as the
1920’s, Government regulators noted the problem with drug abuse in
federal prisons. In response, the Government created two special
prisons (“Narcotic Farms”) to treat convicted felons addicted to
opioids and cocaine.171 Despite several acts, amendments, and
regulations, the U.S. Government has not been able to slow the tide of
drug abuse. The abuse of prescription drugs in particular has become
the “fastest growing drug problem in the United States.”172
Traditional drugs of abuse, such as heroin and cocaine, are
losing prevalence in the United States. Prescription narcotics are
quickly filling this void. 173 Hydrocodone prescriptions in the United
States alone constitute almost ninety-percent of the world’s narcotic
prescriptions.174 The rise of narcotic prescriptions began in the 1980s
when the academic journal Pain recommended that narcotic pain
medication could be distributed for non-cancer pain without risk of
classic opioid abuse. Following this recommendation, pharmaceutical
companies, like Johnson & Johnson, began aggressively marketing
their narcotic products for general pain.175

171

See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 599; MUSTO, supra note 35, at
239 (noting that the 1965 Amendment shifted the FDA’s power away from the
taxing power to the interstate and commerce powers per the recommendation of the
1963 Advisory Committee).
172
The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, 30 (2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-andresearch/ndcs2010.pdf.
173
Michelle Castillo, UN: Designer Drug Abuse a Growing Problem, CBS
NEWS (June 26, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-204_162-57591114/.
174
Celine Grounder, Who is Responsible for the Pain-Pill Epidemic?, THE NEW
YORKER
(November
12,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/11/who-is-responsible-forthe-pain-pill-epidemic.html (suggesting that doctors are very responsible for the
current pain-med epidemic).
175
Id. (noting that the aggressive marketing of fast-acting narcotics has led to
criminal convictions for misleading the public and practitioners concerning the
safety of these products of slow-acting narcotics).
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Al-Jazeera did not exaggerate by calling the prescription drug
problem an “epidemic” in the United States.176 The number of deaths
resulting from narcotic abuse in the United States has quadrupled
since 1999.177 Notably, no hard evidence appears to support the use
of narcotics for long-term pain, as studies have shown that most
narcotics only remain effective for twelve to sixteen weeks.178
Despite nearly five billion pills prescribed annually, federal reports
note that the average patient only takes narcotics for about fourteen
days, creating ample opportunity for illegal distribution.179 As noted
above, the extent of the problem has reached such epidemic
proportions that the FDA must now consider potential side-effects
(i.e., addictiveness and abuse-potential) before approving NDAs to
assess whether the new drug “pose[s] too great a hazard to justify
granting approval.”180
Beyond the abuse of pharmaceuticals, the DEA must also deal
with the influx of designer drugs. Designer drugs are “chemically
altered compounds derived from federally controlled substances.”181
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes that there are
almost a limitless number of possible alterations that can be made to a
drug’s chemical structure to alter the drug enough from its scheduled
counterpart, removing it from DEA control.182 Approved drugs have
a level of stability that makes them safer for human consumption.
However, the lack of control over the manufacturing process and the
tweaks necessary to create designer chemicals make the effects of
these drugs unpredictable. At times, these drugs produce violent
behavior when their scheduled counterparts do not.183 Because these
substances are chemically different than the scheduled product, the
DEA lacks jurisdiction and now must race to catch up. As of
176

See Ahmed, supra note 8.
Meier, supra note 11.
178
Grounder, supra note 174.
179
Meier, supra note 11.
180
Noah, supra note 115, at 56.
181
D.K. Beebe & E. Walley, Substance Abuse: The Designer Drugs, 43.5 AM.
FAM. PHYSICIAN 1689 (1991).
182
See Castillo, supra note 173 (focusing on the problem internationally).
183
See Designer Drugs on the Rise as Demand for Traditional Drugs Levels
Off, UN Reports on World Drug Day, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 26, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45272&Cr=unodc&Cr1=#.UoP6
UJTwLVs.
177
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September 9, 2013, only four of the thirty products awaiting DEA
scheduling procedures were FDA-approved products.184
The market failure model associated with the abuse of
prescription drugs includes preference related problem, illegitimate
preferences, and irrational groups. With legal sales of narcotics
topping $8.5 billion dollars a year, the illegal use of prescriptions and
designer drugs is undoubtedly a very lucrative albeit illegal market.185
Furthermore, the number of prescriptions written for narcotic drugs
has “nearly tripled in the last two decades,” glutting the market (i.e,
illegitimate preferences).186 In 2010, the number of prescriptions
written for narcotic painkillers in the United States could medicate
every American citizen for one month. Not surprisingly, the rise in
prescriptions written directly correlates with the increased addiction
rates (i.e., irrational groups).187
This market failure is directly connected to a government
failure. The FDA, when approving prescription drugs, has little
control over the practice of medicine, allowing doctors to prescribe
FDA-approved drugs for unapproved uses.188 As of the passage of the
FDAAA in 2007, the FDA has gained some regulatory power over the
distribution of drugs through the Risk Evaluation and Mitigations
Strategies (“REMS”) system.189 The FDA can impose a REMS
paradigm on a New Chemical Entity (“NCE”) at the time of approval
or anytime thereafter.190 The REMS system allows the FDA to limit
distribution to health care providers with particular training or
experience, specially certified pharmacies or dispensers, distribution
in special settings, distribution only with evidence of safe-use
conditions (e.g., making a woman verify that she is not pregnant
before administering a drug), subjection to patient monitoring

184

See DEA Response, supra note 18 (statistics comes from the Declaration of
Joseph Rannazzisi appended to the Response).
185
See Barry Meier, A New Painkiller Crackdown Targets Drug Distributors,
N.Y.
TIMES
(October
17,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/business/to-fight-prescription-painkillerabuse-dea-targets-distributors.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
186
Ahmed, supra note 8.
187
See id.
188
See 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
189
See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1.
190
See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)-(2).
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services, or patient enrollment in a drug registry, amongst other
precautions.191
Ultimately, these are very limited distribution
controls.192 Note, however, that none of these restrictions allow the
FDA to regulate the specific uses or types of pain that these REMSregime drugs may be prescribed to treat. Currently, narcotic
prescriptions are limited to Schedule II drugs, restraining prescriptions
to three thirty-day supplies per doctor’s visit.193
B. The Status Quo: The Case of Eisai Inc.
On August 19, 2013 Eisai Inc. (“Eisai”) filed for a Writ of
Mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to force the DEA to schedule its NCE, Fycompa
(generically paempanel). Without DEA scheduling, Eisai is unable to
market its new drug.194 The FDA approved Fycompa on October 22,
2012 “as adjunctive therapy for treatment of partial-onset seizures
with or without secondarily generalized seizures in patients with
epilepsy aged 12 years and older.”195 Eisai asked for the Court’s
assistance because the DEA had delayed on scheduling Fycompa for
nearly ten months since FDA-approval.196 For Eisai, ten months is an
unreasonable amount of time because the delay prevents patients from
accessing a much-needed drug, and scheduling does not require
significant resources from the DEA.197 Ultimately, the court did not

191

See § 355-1(f)(3)(D).
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP (October 9, 2007), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/2d3ce0d0ec9e-4d8b-a376-3d79293d830f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a514e76e029b-4f0e-b9e106e3ef3dc7ef/Food%20and%20Drug%20Administration%20Amendments%20Act
%20of%202007.pdf [hereinafter Covington Memo].
193
See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b).
194
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17.
195
Letter from Robert Temple, Deputy Director, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, to Heather Bradley, Eisai Inc., (Oct. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2012/202834Orig1s000Approv
.pdf (approved labeling also available at site).
196
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 13.
197
See id.
192
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agree that the DEA’s delay “warrant[ed] the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus.”198
The delay of Fycompa is simply one delay in a growing
number of DEA scheduling delays over the last fifteen years. The
average time between FDA approval of an NCE and DEA’s
completion of scheduling is now 237.6 days, an almost 200-day
increase from 49.3 days in 1997-1999.199 In the case of Fycompa,
Eisai contends that the budget and sequester are no excuse for DEA’s
delays because the number of staff compared to the total budget are
still higher than 1997 levels, when the delays first began. It explicitly
states that the delays began long before Congress enacted the
sequestration. Eisai also notes that the 21 U.S.C. § 821 allows the
DEA to impose user-fees on manufacturers and distributors to
expedite the scheduling process.200 However, Eisai’s understanding
of the DEA’s budget fails to account for its increased spending in
educational efforts to contend with the designer drug problem. These
educational efforts include twenty-eight presentations in the last three
years. Increased trial preparation also strains the DEA’s budget.201
Ultimately, the DEA appears to be ill-equipped to deal with FDAapproved scheduling on top of the rest of its responsibilities.
For Eisai, the delay in DEA scheduling has two immediate
consequences: 1) The DEA’s delay prevents a much-needed product
from reaching patients suffering from epilepsy, and 2) The DEA’s
delay costs Eisai capital that it will not be able to recoup due to loss of
market exclusivity. In its Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Eisai first
details how complex epilepsy is, focusing on the numerous versions
of the disease and how no one drug has shown the ability to prevent
all types of seizures, even with the best available treatment. Thus,
having variety in available treatments is extremely important when
considering epilepsy. Eisai designed Fycompa to treat partial-onset
(focal) seizures, which “occur in about 60 percent of people with
epilepsy.”202
Notably, patients are suffering an actual harm,
198

See In re: Eisai Inc., Order, No. 13-1243, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 2013)
(dismissing the issue as moot in response to DEA’s notice of proposed rulemaking
announcement).
199
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 10.
200
See id. at 11-12.
201
See DEA Response, supra note 18, at 13-14.
202
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 16.
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exemplified by the 102 healthcare providers who have inquired with
the company about the drug’s availability for their patients.203
Second, Eisai’s financial forecast for 2013 anticipated
Fycompa’s approval and admittance onto the market. Considering
Fycompa’s potential market, the company estimated that during fiscal
year 2013, the drug would bring in $21.5 million in net sales.
According to Eisai, if the company is unable to count on Fycompa’s
income, it will have to revise reinvestment and innovation plans for
the following year. Furthermore, the company believes that because
of this delay, it will not be able to recover for the research,
development, and NDA user-fees needed to develop the product.
Recovering the costs used to develop a drug usually requires several
years of exclusive marketability. Eisai notes that Fycompa is the only
drug that targets “glutamate activity at postsynaptic AMPA
receptors.”204 Because of the delay, Eisai fears that competitors will
find another means to affect the AMPA receptors, limiting Fycompa’s
marketability further.205 Notably, the reinvestment of capital is a
major component of Congress’s intent with the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA.
Interestingly, Eisai’s Citizen’s Petition to the FDA requests
restoration of Fycompa’s data exclusivity when the DEA reaches its
final scheduling decision.206 Since the FDA approved Fycompa on
Oct. 22, 2012, its exclusivity period would terminate on Oct. 22,
2017. However, based on Fycompa’s patent data, Eisai could still
have exclusivity for its product until June 8, 2021, barring a suit to
challenge the patent.207 So long as the patent is valid, patent
exclusivity lasts even when market exclusivity has expired. While
patent exclusivity may be challenged and lost, market exclusivity is

203

See id. at 17.
See id. at 6-7.
205
See id. at 7.
206
Letter from Allen Waxman, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, Eisai
Inc., to Food & Drug Administration, at 2 (July 25, 2013),
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/Eisai_Inc_Citizen_Petition.pdf [hereinafter Citizen’s
Petition].
207
Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (March 21, 2014),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfm?Appl_No=202
834&Product_No=006&table1=OB_Rx [hereinafter Orange Book].
204
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guaranteed when receiving FDA approval.208 As noted, Eisai’s
primary concern with Fycompa is that a competitor will create another
means to affect the AMPA receptors and it will not have recouped its
expenditures beforehand.
The DEA’s delays result from inefficient inter-agency
cooperation and coordination, primarily the DEA’s and FDA’s
differing policy goals. The DEA concerns itself with scheduling for
abuse enforcement. In contrast, the FDA’s primary goal is to get
drugs that are safe and effective onto the market quickly. While some
cooperation does exist between the agencies, their rulemaking
procedures are largely independent of each other due to the agencies’
different goals. When a company submits an NDA, the FDA will
evaluate the drug briefly for potential abuse risks. Health and Human
Services will then perform an analysis and make a recommendation to
the DEA concerning the NCE’s scheduling.209 After receiving the
recommendation, the DEA begins its own analysis, using the same
standards as HHS, before making its final rule.210
The DEA justifies the distinction between the rulemaking
procedures by focusing on the different goals of the two agencies. If
there is an administrative hearing or challenge to the rulemaking, the
DEA will have to defend its rulemaking but the FDA will not be held
accountable for its recommendation.211 The DEA reinforces the
contention that their goals are separate by showing that the DEA and
FDA have different resources available to their analysis of the NCE.
Because the DEA is primarily concerned with abuse enforcement, it
supplements its research with data from the National Forensic
Laboratory Information System and the System to Retrieve
Information from Drug Evidence. The DEA further notes that even
with equal access to information, the analysis and conclusions “may
208

See Charles Clift, Data Protection and Data Exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals
and Agrochemicals, in The IP Handbook of Best Practices 431, 433 (Anatole
Krattiger,
ed.,
2012),
available
at
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/ch04/ipHandbookCh%2004%2009%20Clift%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Exclusivity.pdf.
209
See 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2012).
210
See § 811(c); DEA Response, supra note 18, at 4-8.
211
See DEA Response, supra note 18, at 6-7; see also Placement of
Carisoprodol into Schedule IV, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,330, 77,335 (Dec. 12, 2011) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308).
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differ” due to the agencies’ intentions and experience.212 Notably, if
the FDA does not recommend scheduling, the DEA will not consider
the NCE at all.213 Due to the growing drug problem, however, FDA
may be overly cautious when making recommendations.
IV.

FDA’S POWER: SUBSTITUTING THE STATUS QUO WITH RISK
EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

For the first sixty-four years of its existence, the FDA
controlled almost all regulation regarding narcotics in the U.S.
market, black or otherwise. Congress took a new approach with the
creation of the DEA and the Controlled Substances regime. However,
the narcotic abuse and designer drug problem has taxed the limitations
of this regime. It seems that no matter how much funding pours into
the DEA, the problem is unstoppable. The problem has sapped the
DEA’s resources so badly that the FDA has felt the direct effects of
the growing problem for the last fifteen years. Now, under the REMS
regime, it is time for the FDA to take full responsibility for the
chemicals passing through its system, acting not only to move
pharmaceuticals onto the market faster but also ensure their safe
distribution.
This section recommends the different steps that the FDA
could take to remedy the present problem. First, this paper briefly
describes why simply renewing the five-year exclusivity period upon
receiving DEA approval is insufficient to meet the needs of this
problem. Second, it strongly recommends that the FDA simply take
over the scheduling procedure for its own products, to which the DEA
would then adhere for enforcement. Finally, as an alternative, this
paper recommends that the DEA and FDA enter into joint rulemaking
to schedule FDA-approved (or soon-to-be approved) pharmaceuticals.
A. Delaying Approval
Eisai’s primary injury from the delay of Fycompa is the loss of
market exclusivity guaranteed to the company under the HatchWaxman Amendments to the FDCA. As noted above, because of the
212
213

See DEA Response, supra note 18, at 7.
See id. at 5.
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delay, Fycompa has lost over a year of its market exclusivity, as the
FDA started the “clock” when it approved the drug in October 2012.
Along with its Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the D.C. Circuit,
Eisai also filed a Citizens Petition with the FDA in an effort to restore
its full market exclusivity for Fycompa and another drug Belviq.214
When considering Eisai’s Citizen’s Petition, the obvious
question becomes, is it not the easiest solution to simply delay the
FDA’s approval of an NDA subject to DEA scheduling until the DEA
finishes its rulemaking? This is undoubtedly the easiest solution,
second only to continuing on with the status quo. However, there are
important public policy points to consider that make this an
undesirable solution.
1. Loss of Capital
One of Eisai’s major complaints was the loss of income
associated with marketing Fycompa. The company noted it had made
its fiscal year 2013 projections based upon receiving approval to
market its drug. Eisai noted that because it had not received approval,
it would now not be able to meet projections that would have allowed
it to reinvest its capital into further development or pay for the
research, development, and implementation of Fycompa.215
Restoring the five-year exclusivity would solve this problem,
in part. It would grant the company a full term to restore its losses. In
its Petition for Mandamus, the corporation noted that it often takes
many years of marketing for a company to recoup the losses
associated with the development of the product.216 Simply delaying
approval until the DEA completes its scheduling fails to account for
predictability. Eisai was unable to account for the DEA’s delay when
creating its fiscal plan for 2013. Furthermore, Eisai notes that the
delays between the FDA’s recommendation to the DEA and the
DEA’s final rulemaking have grown substantially in the last fifteen
years without pause.217 With the current backlog at the DEA and the
ever-growing designer drug problem, waiting for DEA approval
before commencing market exclusivity does not allow corporations to
214

See Citizen’s Petition, supra note 206.
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 6-7.
216
See id.
217
See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 11-12.
215
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have any more predictability in their financial planning, despite giving
them their full term to recoup losses.
2. Potential Competition
Eisai also feared that the delay would allow its competitors to
mimic its product. In the Petition for Mandamus, Eisai noted that
Fycompa was the only anti-seizure drug whose active ingredient
focuses on the AMPA receptors to prevent symptoms. The company
suggested that the delay may allow time for competitors find another
way to target the AMPA receptors in a way that would not violate
Fycompa’s exclusivity.218 Waiting for FDA approval would protect
any company from competition as the contents of the NDA would
remain private until approval and the patent would not be listed in the
Orange Book until NDA approval. For Eisai, not only is Fycompa’s
patent public in the Orange Book,219 but the company is also losing
the exclusivity period that would keep generics out of the market.
Notably, the FDA has just approved a new drug for focal seizures,
like Fycompa, under a REMS regime requiring the inclusion of Med
Guides.220
3. In the case of Life Saving Drugs
Finally, Eisai noted there was no drug like Fycompa on the
market. Epilepsy comes in many forms without a single best
treatment. As such, having more products on the market provides
more options for physicians and patients. Fycompa is the only drug
that currently focuses on the AMPA receptors. With NDA approval,
the FDA has certified that the drug is safe and effective for use for a
legitimate medical purpose. Waiting on DEA scheduling does
nothing to hasten this process. As discussed in the section on capital
loss, the time between FDA-approval and DEA scheduling is ever
increasing. At this point, relying on DEA approval shows no signs of

218

See id. at 7.
See Orange Book, supra note 207.
220
See FDA approves Aptiom to treat seizures in adults, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
(NOV.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm374358.htm.
219
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ensuring that potentially life-saving drugs reach the market any
faster.221
B. The FDA’s Power Under a REMS Regime
Prior to the FDAAA, having the FDA regulate potentially
addictive drugs would have been wildly inefficient. The FDA would
have lacked the statutory authority to limit distribution for potentially
hazardous drugs or to ensure that the dispensers of the drug were
adequately trained for potential adverse events.222 While the FDA has
had limited controls over the practice of medicine, the REMS regime
allows the FDA to have some control over the distribution of
potentially harmful drugs.
There are several similarities between the REMS regime and
the CSA provisions. Unlike the CSA, the REMS regime does not
give the FDA statutory power to require registration with the Attorney
General before producing potentially addictive drugs that would have
been highly scheduled under the CSA.223 However, like the CSA,
REMS allow the FDA to specify the type of pharmacy or healthcare
setting where the drug can be dispensed.224 With this in mind, it
seems obvious that the FDA has significant power under the REMS
regime to limit the distribution of potentially harmful drugs, including
narcotics that may be approved under a non-DEA approval regime.
This FDA power is further bolstered by the fact that the REMS allow
the FDA to limit distribution to a “certain healthcare setting, such as
[a] hospital.”225 The FDA can also require prescribers of REMSrestricted drugs to register with the agency as a prerequisite to
prescribing the drug.226
The REMS regime permits the FDA powers beyond that of the
CSA in restricting use. For instance, when approving Revlimid, the
221

See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 7.
See Am. Pharm. Ass’n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1974).
223
But see 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)-(b).
224
Compare § 823(b) (requiring registration with the Attorney General before
distribution of Schedule II drugs based on five criteria) with FDCA § 505-1(f)(3)(B)
(requiring that pharmacies who which to dispense drugs under certain REMS
paradigms attain special certification before being able to lawfully dispense them).
225
FDCA § 505-1(f)(3)(C).
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See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
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FDA instituted a REMS regime to prevent fetal exposure to the
drug.227 As part of the REMS, the consumer had to enroll in a patient
registry in accordance with § 505-1(f)(3)(E).228 More to the point, the
REMS requires that before receiving the drug initially, the patient
must submit to a pregnancy test. The patient then must submit to
another pregnancy test each time a doctor prescribes the drug from
that point forward.229 FDA-mandated drug screening is common in
opioid REMS. The screens check not only the presence of opioids but
also the presence of any other illicit product. If the prescribed opioid
is not present in the user’s system, the REMS prevents a doctor from
continuing to prescribe the narcotics to the patient.230 The REMS for
Nucynta, an extended release opioid for pain control, requires “regular
evaluation and documentation” of urine drug screening, but leaves to
the discretion of the physician what qualifies as “regular.”231
The FDA also has the power under REMS to limit
prescriptions. Under the CSA, Schedule II drugs are limited to 90
days supplies, passed out through three separate, non-refillable
prescriptions.232 In the case of Revlimid, the FDA has severely
limited how the drug may be prescribed, a prescription regime much
more severe than those pushed by Schedule II under the CSA. The
REMS mandates that the drug not be prescribed for more than a 28day supply.
The prescription cannot be subject to refill or
prescriptions by phone—a physician must sign them. Finally, a
pharmacy can only fill a prescription within seven days of the
completion of the existing prescription.233 Notably, when considering
227

See Revlimid, supra note 169, at 1.
See id.
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See id. at 2.
230
See Ted Jones et al, Urine Drug Testing as an Evaluation of Risk,
PRACTICAL
PAIN
MGMT.
(June
1,
2010),
http://www.practicalpainmanagement.com/treatments/pharmacological/opioids/urin
e-drug-testing-evaluation-risk (noting that urine tests, frequent visits, and pill counts
should be mandatory for all patients receiving opioid).
231
See Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies – Nucynta, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
36
(August
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformatio
nforPatientsandProviders/UCM270224.pdf.
232
See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b); 70 Fed. Reg. 50408 (Aug. 25, 2005); 71 Fed.
Reg. 52724 (Sept. 6, 2009).
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See Revlimid, supra note 169, at 77-78.
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the REMS and prescriptions, the FDA considers the duration of drug
treatment when creating the REMS,234 allowing for specific controls
on each drug under the regime.
Finally, the FDA is not unfamiliar with the standards by which
the DEA performs its schedule rulemaking. As noted above, when the
FDA makes its recommendation to the DEA concerning an NDA, the
FDA uses the same criteria to make its recommendation.235 In the last
fifteen years, the same time that the DEA’s scheduling delays began,
the FDA’s recommendations and the DEA’s scheduling decisions
have not differed.236 Furthermore, the FDA is required to enter into
notice and comment rulemaking before scheduling drugs, as is the
DEA.237 Though the FDA’s REMS considerations do not have the
exact language of the CSA, it is important to note that occurrences of
overdose, abuse, or withdrawal qualify as an “adverse drug
experience” for consideration in the REMS’ creation.238
The largest problem with this recommendation is that FDA
lacks sufficient enforcement power. The FDA can bring civil actions
against companies violating the REMS, but not in excess of “$10
million for all violations in a single proceeding.”239 These suits would
fall under the misbranding provisions of the FDCA.240 While there
are criminal penalties for violations of the FDCA,241 the FDA’s Office
of Criminal Investigations focuses primarily on protecting its
regulatory process. For the FDA, criminal investigations are a
234

See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)(D).
See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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See Petition for Mandamus, supra note 17, at 11.
237
HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 810; see e.g., Int'l Drug
Scheduling; Convention on Psychotropic Substances; Single Convention on
Narcotics, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,779 (Dec. 13, 2005).
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See 21 U.S.C § 355-1(b)(1)(B)-(D).
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Questions and Answers on the Federal Register Notice on Drugs and
Biological Products Deemed to Have Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosme
ticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FoodandDrugAdministrationA
mendmentsActof2007/ucm095439.htm (last updated June 18, 2009).
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But see Kathleen Struck, OIG: Drug REMS Falling Short, MEDPAGE TODAY
(Feb.
14,
2013),
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response to an inability to remedy a situation in its regulatory
scheme.242 Where penalties arguably exist, the criminal penalty
cannot exceed one year.243 Furthermore, if a drug under a REMS
regime faces abuse like that of hydrocodone, but was not scheduled
by the DEA, the agency will have no power to bring charges against
individual abusers.
This regime would still require the DEA to schedule its own
drugs, but would not require the NDA applicant to wait for that
scheduling before entering the market.244 Arguably, this would allow
the DEA discretion over whether to schedule an FDA-approved drug
at all. For example, if Fycompa has potential for abuse but abuse does
not appear to be an issue, the DEA would not need to waste resources
scheduling the drug. An FDA REMS over Fycompa could limit
distribution beyond that of DEA scheduling and ensure that
physicians act with proper care. While a pure FDA REMS regime is
not without its risks, the solution would allow both the FDA and the
DEA to better assess their use of resources.
C. Alternatives to Outright Action: Joint Rulemaking
With the ever-growing narcotic abuse epidemic resulting in
thousands of deaths a year, undoubtedly concerns would arise if DEA
was left out of the approval process for new drugs showing the
potential for abuse. As an alternative to FDA’s complete control, the
FDA and DEA could enter into joint rulemaking procedures to
schedule drugs. In this regard, the NCE would fall under the FDA’s
REMS regime for distribution and under the CSA’s scheduling for
242

See Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations,
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DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm123027.htm (last updated
Jan. 28, 2015).
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See FDCA § 301(c) (“The receipt . . . of any food, drug . . . that is
adulterated or misbranded, and the delivery of proffered delivery therefore for pay
or otherwise.”); FDCA § 301(a)(1) (“Any person who violates a provision of section
301 shall be imprisoned for not more than one year.”).
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But see Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, at 7-8,
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Final-Recommendation-2012-5-ImprovingAgency-Coordination.pdf (recommending better coordination between agencies for
improving joint rulemaking and interagency agreements).
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any potential abuse enforcement. This process would be particularly
efficient as the FDA and DEA have the same considerations when
assessing potentially abusive drugs.245
Agencies have entered into joint rulemaking where their
responsibilities have overlapped. A major recent example is the joint
rulemaking between the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to regulate
greenhouse gas emission from automobiles.246 The factors involved
in this rulemaking made it particularly complex. The two agencies,
along with the automobile industry, had to consider “complex
differences in the statutes involved, the substantial costs and benefits,
environmental effects, and international implications.”247 The FDA
and DEA would have similar challenges, particularly concerning the
complexity of their statutes, their different agendas, and public health
concerns. While joint rulemaking is not unfeasible, the process may
not prevent the delays currently faced by the DEA-only system.
D. Evaluating Outcome Criteria
Criteria for evaluating solutions for this problem appear to be
antithetical to each other in many regards. On one hand, the solution
to this problem should create a quicker, more efficient process for
pharmaceutical companies to place potentially addictive drugs on the
open market. On the other hand, the solution should neither undercut
the DEA’s enforcement ability nor remove the DEA’s ability to
regulate the sale, distribution, and use of legitimate pharmaceuticals
on the market. The best solution to this problem would allow both
agencies to increase their individual effectiveness while reducing their
individual monetary and personnel costs.
The primary solution criterion would be the quickened
admittance of FDA-approved NCE onto the market, while
maintaining the strict safety standards in the present system.
245

See id.
See President Obama Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy, WHITE
HOUSE (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/president-obama-announces-national-fuel-efficiency-policy.
247
Neil Eisner, DOT-EPA: Serving as a Model for Joint Rulemaking, ADMIN.
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Undoubtedly, the primary concern for pharmaceutical companies is
profits.
Recognizing the manufacturers’ concerns, the HatchWaxman Act automatically grants every NCE approved by the FDA
an automatic five-year exclusivity period wherein no generic can enter
the market, allowing the parent company to recoup its capital to
reinvest in further research and development. In the case of Eisai, the
company’s primary concern with the DEA’s “unreasonable delay” is
that it has now lost ten months of this exclusivity without actually
marketing Fycompa in the United States.248
Assuming
pharmaceutical companies do reinvest their capital into further
research and development, the FDA REMS regime is multiplicative,
as each new drug developed by the manufacturers will benefit from
the streamlined process.
Notably, the Hatch-Waxman Act does provide for patent-term
restoration when an administrative agency has delayed.249 However,
this offers little help to companies under a split FDA-DEA regime.
Under the law, a company must apply for patent term extension
within sixty days of agency approval.250 For the FDA, the sixty-day
period begins when the NDA is approved, regardless of subsequent
DEA action. Eisai indicated in its Citizen’s Petition that it intends to
argue that the period should not begin until the company can market
Fycompa.251 However, the company’s primary concern is ensuring
that the five-year exclusivity period begins upon DEA approval.
Additionally, simply extending the patent term or exclusivity period
does not address the issue of quickly admitting a potentially lifesaving drug onto the market.
Second, but of equal importance, any solution must not limit
the DEA’s enforcement power in any regard due to the grave nature
of the designer drug problem in the United States. As stated above,
the DEA only has jurisdiction over drugs upon which it has performed
rulemaking procedures. In its Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Eisai
248
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argues that the DEA’s delay is further unreasonable because each
drug that has needed scheduling since 1997 has followed the
recommendation of HHS, often without public hearings before
rulemaking completion.252
However, simply codifying HHS’s
recommendation without DEA rulemaking would not grant DEA
enforcement power as the law stands now. In this regard, the EPA
and DOT’s combined rulemaking regarding the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions demonstrates that joint rulemaking is not
out of the question.253 As of now, the FDA’s REMS regime is illequipped to combat the growing designer drug problem, but could
more effectively control its own approved drugs.254 A strong solution
would not only maximize efficiency in rulemaking procedure,
accounting for the time spent by the agencies in their rule making and
the efficient use of agency resources (i.e., tax payer money), but
would also bolster the efficacy of both agencies to actually “have
teeth” in enforcement.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Government’s attempts to control and
regulate the import, manufacture, distribution, and consumption of
narcotic drugs has varied as Congress’s powers have changed over the
last century and as the public health crisis associated with narcotic
abuse has become more prevalent and fatal. As the designer drug
problem has worsened, the approval of new beneficial drugs has
become more cumbersome and time consuming.
Recognizing that many beneficial drugs are also very
dangerous, Congress, through the FDAAA, gave more power to the
FDA to limit the supply of drugs with potential for abuse in the
market. With these regulations alone, the FDA has the power to
quickly and effectively allow life-saving drugs to enter the market
quickly while still addressing policy concerns and without further
contributing to the designer drug epidemic. In this light, Congress
252

See id. at 11.
See President Obama Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy, supra
note 245 (allowing the EPA and FTC to focus on the common problem of regulating
green house gas emissions in a way that maximized their resources).
254
See Covington Memo, supra note 192.
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should give the FDA more power to regulate its own drugs with the
potential for abuse through its REMS regime, allowing the DEA to
perform its own rulemaking if the need arises.

